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Man is by nature religious. Being religious, man has always been
interested in questions about the existence of God, the phenomenon of
faith, the fact of religious beliefs and all those matters connected with hu-
man religiosity in general.
Faith is one topic that has always been, and continues to be, an inte-
gral part of the subject matters discussed and studied by both theologians
and philosophers. This is especially true in the philosophical traditions of
the East and the West1. Having been influenced by Christianity, which
played a very powerful role in its development, philosophy in the Western
tradition has given an ample treatment to the question of faith is an issue
which is undeniably present and prominent in the Old Testament, and the
New Testament wich, of course, form the Sacred Scriptures of Christiani-
ty2. It is no wonder then that philosophical reflections on faith, of the
Christian faith in particular, has since ancient times captured the interest of
many a philosopher. That interest continues until the present day.
The Vienna Circle was a group of scientists, philosophers and
mathematicians which launched one of the biggest challenges Christianity
had to hurdle in the middle of the last century. Operating from an empiri-
cist perspective where all knowledge is grounded in experience, this group
claimed that all meaningful propositions must be either analytic/tautologi-
cal or verifiable empirically. They launched the so-called verifiability prin-
ciple, according to which the meaning of a proposition lies in the mode of
its empirical verification. Since the theological and religious assertions of
believers are not empirically verifiable according to their standards, they
claimed that religious discourse is nonsensical and empty of cognitive
PRESENTATION
1. Cfr. SESSIONS, W.L., The Concept of Faith, Cornell University Press, New
York 1994, p. vii.
2. Cfr. WOLTERSTORFF, N.P., «Faith», in CRAIG, E., (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Vol. III, Routledge, London 1998, p. 539.
meaning. Closely allied to this principle is the falsifiability principle of
Anthony Flew, who contended that since believers allow nothing to count
against their assertions, then these assertions do not say anything at all,
they neither affirm nor deny anything.
One of those who responded to the challenges by the logical posi-
tivists was an American philosopher by the name of James F. Ross, a
Catholic philosopher and a member of the philosophy and law departments
of the University of Pennsylvania. Ross summarizes the anti-cognitive at-
tacks against the faith into, among other terms, the inaccessibility chal-
lenge and the skeptical challenge. He responds to these challenges by
showing that upon closer examination, these challenges do not hold water.
He answers the inaccessibility challenge by claiming that religious dis-
course is a craft-bound discourse and that one must participate in the craft
where the discourse is utilized in order to fully grasp it. He responds to the
skeptical challenge by asserting that testimony is a source of knowledge
and that nothing epistemically deficient or weird happened in the originat-
ing experiences of the Apostles and prophets in their encounter with God
in revelatory events.
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This article discusses the cognitive character of faith. James F.
Ross supports the thesis that there is nothing that can prevent faith from
being knowledge. The question of the cognitivity of faith arose in the mid-
dle of the last century, which saw various challenges, if not outright denial,
to the cognitive character of faith. These challenges has as their immediate
origin the logical positivism or neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle.
This shall be divided into five main parts. The first part will dis-
cuss the question of the relation between faith and cognitivity (I.); the sec-
ond part will present some non-cognitive analysis of faith (II.); the third
part will discuss some cognitive analysis of faith (III); the fourth section
will deal with religious discourse as a craft-bound discourse, in answer to
the anti-cognitive challenge called the inaccessibility challenge (IV); and
the last section will present the claim that testimony is a source of knowl-
edge, in answer to another anti-cognitive challenge called the skeptical
challenge (V).
I. FAITH AND THE COGNITIVITY QUESTION
1. THE LOGICAL POSITIVISM OF THE VIENNA CIRCLE
Although aware of its difficulties, traditional philosophy of religion
never seriously doubted the possibility of speaking meaningfully of God1.
According to Ross, the first modern version of non-cognitivism was
launched by David Hume when, at the end of his inquiry, he claimed that
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any book that contains metaphysics should be consigned to the flames2. It
was however the development of logical positivism or neo-positivism of
the Vienna Circle in the middle of the last century, which seriously ques-
tioned the meaning and significance of religious propositions, «putting a
new curve into an otherwise old pitch»3.
The Vienna Circle was a group composed of scientists, philoso-
phers and mathematicians which met weekly to develop a highly scientif-
ic and empiricist approach to philosophy. The spirit of this group can be
summarized in the phrase The Scientific Vision of the World. With this ex-
pression, they wanted to show that philosophy must be scientific and must
imitate science in its clarity and logical rigor4. Prominent members of the
group included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Kurt Godel
and Friedrich Waismann, among others5. Taking scientific language to be
the model of meaningful discourse, this group was convinced that all
meaningful propositions (aside from analytic or tautological statements)
must refer to situations which are empirically verifiable; otherwise, out-
side the possibility of empirical verification, propositions are meaningless
or nonsensical. They constructed what came to be known as the verifiabil-
ity principle. This principle claims that «the meaning of a proposition lies
in the mode of its empirical verification». The statement for example that
«the rice pudding is tasteless» would be verified empirically if one actual-
ly tastes the rice pudding. Corollary to this principle is the claim that cog-
nitive language must express an empirical state of affairs6. Restating the
principle in a slightly different way, one can say that «a statement is a
genuine factual assertion if, and only if, there could be empirically ob-
servable states of affairs that would show it to be either true or false»7.
One of the intended objectives of the Vienna Circle was the elimi-
nation of metaphysics. Rudolf Carnap, a member of the circle, affirmed:
«our thesis is that logical analysis has revealed that the pretended proposi-
tions of metaphysics are in reality pseudo-propositions»8. Applying this
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2. ROSS, J.F., «Religious Language» in DAVIES, B. (ed.), Philosophy of Religion,
A Guide to the Subject, Cassell, London 1998, p. 117.
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5. Cfr. STIVER, D.R., The Philosophy of Religious Language, Sign, Symbol and
Story, Blackwell, Massachusetts 1997, p. 42.
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J., «Neopositivismo y filosofia analítica: balance de un siglo» Acta Philosophica, 8
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8. CARNAP, R., La Superación de la metafísica mediante el análisis lógico del
lenguaje, p. 67 quoted in ARTIGAS, M., El Desafío de la racionalidad, p. 34.
idea to different concrete cases, such as to concepts like «principle»,
«God», «the Absolute», «the Infinite», he concluded that «the pretended
propositions of metaphysics which contain these words do not have mean-
ing, they do not declare anything, they are mere pseudo-propositions»9.
Carnap therefore proposed the expulsion of metaphysical and religious
propositions from the realm of cognitive and meaningful discourse for be-
ing empirically non-verifiable10. For Carnap, the term «God» lacks seman-
tic meaning and all religious language are but expressions of vital emo-
tions.
A. J. Ayer who developed and extended the spirit of the Vienna
Circle to the English-speaking world, expressed the verifiability principle
in this way:
«the criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent
statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is
factually significant to any given person if, and only if, he knows how to
verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows
what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the
proposition as being true, or reject it as being false»11.
Ayer likewise dismissed metaphysical and religious language as
cognitive non-sense. Since metaphysical and religious propositions are not
tautological statements, they have to be empirically verifiable ; since they
are not (Who could for instance empirically verify the religious statement
that «God is eternal?»), they lack cognitive meaning. He emphasized an
emotive approach to ethics and the use of ethical language which for him
is non-cognitive.
With their verifiability principle, logical positivism tied the cogni-
tive meaningfulness of language to empirical verification. Since metaphys-
ical, ethical and religious statements are clearly not empirically verifiable,
the logical positivists dismissed them as cognitively meaningless, lacking
in cognitive value. These propositions lack even the minimal merit of be-
ing meaningful. They are complete cognitive non-sense. As can be no-
ticed, the danger the logical positivists posed to religion is worse compared
to the atheistic position. The atheist might say that for lack of evidence, re-
ligious and theological claims are false. But for the logical positivists,
these claims have not even reached the realm of the meaningful. They are
plainly nonsensical. A. N. Prior once remarked: «the real intellectual diffi-
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culty of the believer or would be believer is not the problem of proof but
the problem of meaning»12.
It was not long before it was discovered that the fundamental ideas
of logical positivism were themselves problematic. «Like a meteor that
shines brightly for a while, then quickly fades, the Vienna Circle per se
faded quickly for a variety of reasons»13. The verifiability principle claims
that a statement is a genuine factual assertion if, and only if, there could be
empirically observable states of affairs that would show it to be either true
or false. However, no empirically observable states of affairs could possi-
bly verify the truth or falsity of this proposition. This principle then en-
counters the problem of self-referential incoherence14. As Stiver observes
«how can one use empirical proof to prove that every cognitively mean-
ingful proposition can only be empirically proven?»15. In fact, this princi-
ple itself appears to be metaphysical and capable of being accepted only on
faith.
Furthermore, the verifiability principle could not make completely
good sense of science. Logical positivists considered scientific language to
be a model of cognitive meaningfulness. However, the history and practice
of science is replete with cases where scientific claims are thought to be
clearly meaningful even if at the time scientists could not specify the exact
verification of these claims. The debate between the wave and corpuscular
theory of light is a case in point16. Scientists are perfectly convinced of the
cognitive meaningfulness of their claims even in the absence of conclusive
verification.
Due to the above problems, logical positivism became less convinc-
ing, and was consequently abandoned as a theory. It is often said that no
one would be proud to call himself a logical positivist today, even if the
spirit of logical positivism continues to influence, wittingly or unwittingly,
many scientific theories. Ross says that the verifiability principle of mean-
ing is a woefully inadequate perspective from which to attack religious be-
lief17. Consequently, it became an abandoned carcass in the morgue of
metaphysics18.
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13. STIVER, D.R., The Philosophy of Religious Language, p. 45.
14. Cfr. PETERSON, et. al., Reason and Religious Belief, p. 144.
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17. Cfr. ROSS, J.F., Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Macmillan,
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2. THE FALSIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE
As a result of the continued efforts by philosophers to refine and ar-
ticulate the basic point of the logical positivists’ view of logical meaning,
Anthony Flew presented his challenge to religious assertions in the form of
the falsifiability principle19, originally proposed by Popper as a «criterion
of demarcation among the propositions of empirical science, metaphysics
and mathematics»20. Popper distinguished science from metaphysics. He
considered that «metaphysics consists in statements which can be mean-
ingful (against the positivists), but cannot be submitted to experimental
proofs; metaphysics would be the field of the non-scientific, which can be
meaningful, but which cannot be an object of objective criticism in the
same way that science is»21. Operating from an empiricist perspective like
the logical positivists, where all knowledge is grounded in experience,
Flew applied Popper’s falsifiability principle to religious and theological
statements.
Flew presented his challenge based on a story entitled «Gods» by
John Wisdom22. He asserted that religious and theological assertions are
deprived of factual meaning for being non-falsifiable statements. The be-
liever for instance asserts that God is a Father who loves his children. In
times of difficulties, one would naturally expect help from God. But God
is silent. So the believer makes some qualifications saying that God’s love
is unlike human love or is inscrutable, making misfortune and suffering
compatible with the original claim. Flew contended that religious believers
allow nothing to count against their claims, continually modifying and
qualifying them so as to prevent them from getting falsified. He asks:
«What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a dis-
proof of the love of, or the existence of God?»23. If there is no state of af-
fairs that would count against or is incompatible with the original theolog-
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23. Ibid., p. 99.
ical assertion, then it is not a genuine assertion at all. It doesn’t say any-
thing, neither affirming nor denying that something is actually the case.
Religious believers end up killing their own claims, subjecting them to the
death by «a thousand qualifications».
Religious propositions like «God has a plan», «God created the
world», «God loves us like a father loves his sons», are not falsifiable and,
therefore, do not have empirical content24. No truth-value can be assigned
to them. He thus says,
«People sometimes claim to know the propositions of their faith.
This is, in the present context, a most unfortunate usage. For to “know”, in
the ordinary and more exacting sense, it is not enough merely to feel ab-
solutely certain and to act accordingly. It is necessary also for your belief to
be in fact right, and for you to have sufficient reason to warrant your confi-
dence. […] The man who “knows”, but who “knows” wrong, or the woman
who “knows” but is unable to produce any grounds for her conviction, does
not in this ordinarily exacting sense, know at all. That is why the word
“know” when applied in such cases has to be wrapped in emasculating in-
verted commas»25.
Flew underscores an important point regarding the question of cog-
nitive meaningfulness namely, if an assertion is compatible with any state
of affairs whatsoever, it is empty since it literally makes no difference
whether one believes it or not26. However, if we grant Flew that the only
allowable proof is empirical, then it is surely hard to defend traditional us-
age of religious language. But this is totally to miss the point of traditional
Christian discourse. Stiver is therefore right in claiming that «Flew’s ap-
proach restricts this whole issue in a novel way by counting only empirical
evidence for the designer (God) as valid, suggesting something that can
hardly be found anywhere in the history of Christian thought, that God is
empirically discernible»27. Flew applies a criterion of meaning which is
foreign to the way cognitive meaning operates in religious assertions, in
total disregard to the original idea of Popper that the falsifiability criterion
applies to science and not to metaphysics and therefore cannot be applied
to religious and theological claims.
Assessing the verifiability and falsifiability criteria of cognitive
meaning, Ross says that they «died of overweight in the 1950’s when it
was established that both the criteria were not themselves verifiable or fal-
sifiable and that any version of the criteria strong enough to cast doubt
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upon religious discourse would also cast doubt upon the heartland of sci-
ence; and that any version weak enough to leave science unchallenged
would permit religion, metaphysics, aesthetics and all other forms of “ef-
fete” thought back into the theater of the meaningful»28.
While the verifiability principle of the logical positivists claimed
that religious propositions do not even have the minimal merit of being
meaningful, Flew’s falsifiability principle denied truth value to religious
assertions. Due to the far-reaching consequences of Flew’s claims,
philosophers were not slow in reacting to his position. From Black-
stone’s work on this topic, it became habitual to classify the reactions of
philosophers into two classes: the right-wing response which defends the
cognitive character of faith and the left-wing response for which faith is
not in any way knowledge29. It is from this essay of Flew that the begin-
ning of the discussion of the cognitive value of faith in analytic philoso-
phy can be properly dated30. For reasons which will be made clear later,
Ross belongs to the right-wing response, since he defends the cognitive
character of faith.
II. NON-COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF FAITH
1. EMOTIVE OR EXPRESSIVE THEORY
Capitulating to Flew’s thesis that religious and theological proposi-
tions cannot be considered cognitive or are deprived of cognitive value,
some philosophers proposed to explain and attribute to religious assertions
a merely expressive or emotive value. This analysis is known as the non-
cognitivist emotive or expressive theory of religious assertions, based on
the empiricist epistemology according to which only facts and the data of
the senses can proportion knowledge. Now since religious or theological
propositions do not pertain to facts nor are about the data of the senses, this
theory then relegates religious and theological propositions to the sphere
of emotions and feelings31. They therefore cannot be true or false since
truth corresponds only to propositions relative to an empirical object.
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This position can be found in John Hermann Randall who claimed
that religion cannot proportion any kind of knowledge – it is a way of act-
ing and feeling and not a way of knowing32. Religious symbols which are
neither descriptive nor explicative, function solely as motives which bring
one to act in a determined way. They help man and recapitulate his experi-
ence of the universe and what it offers to life. The function of religious
symbols is not knowledge in the strict sense but a kind of «knowing how to
act». Thus he claims: «the distinctive character of religious knowledge
which distances it from any form of knowing is that it is not a unique expe-
rience, nor a mystical intuition, or a knowledge of a more elevated level,
but more of an art, a technique, a kind of knowing how to open one’s heart
to see the Divine, to know God in the midst of the conditions of human life
in the natural world»33. For allegedly being only motives for acting, reli-
gious propositions are therefore classified by Randall as lacking in cogni-
tive meaning.
The philosopher who developed more clearly the emotive/ expres-
sive response to the falsifiability challenge of Flew is R. M. Hare, who
likened religious propositions to ethical sentences34. According to Hare, in
both cases one finds expressions of attitudes and intentions of the speaker
but not assertions which can be true or false. Agreeing with the idea of
Flew that religious assertions are deprived of cognitive value35, Hare shifts
ground and claims that religious propositions are expressions of a person’s
attitude with respect to the world; he calls this a blik 36. Without defining
what he exactly means by a blik, he points out that it is an attitude or a fun-
damental decision, or a presupposition which a person takes with respect
to facts and/ or with respect to the world. This attitude is fundamental in
every person and unlike other attitudes it is permanent37. Such an attitude
cannot be overturned even by empirical observation. All persons according
to Hare have bliks which can be sensible or insensible, but never true or
false. Applying his theory to the area of religion, Hare claims that religious
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believers have bliks that God exists and that a certain religious way of life
is correct. Nothing can change this attitude, not even facts which point out
the contrary of what the person believes. Since bliks are nothing but ex-
pressions of a person’s attitude with respect to the world, bliks cannot
claim to be factually significant assertions and consequently, they lack
cognitive content. They are therefore non-cognitive.
This type of analysis is not without serious difficulties, one of
which has been pointed out by Clarke: «undoubtedly, a great part of reli-
gious language, perhaps the greatest part, is used to express attitudes, but
although it may be true, it is presumed that God is the object of faith and
not the attitude itself, and therefore it could be that the assertion “God ex-
ists” may be false or may be deprived of meaning, but as it is used ordinar-
ily, it does not express a blik or an attitude of a person with respect to the
world»38. Furthermore, while Hare claims that one can distinguish a sane
blik from an insane one, he does not offer evidence about how this can be
done. How can one tell which blik is sane or insane, short of evidence? «If
bliks are truly non-cognitive, they seem vulnerable to charges of irrational-
ity, even insanity. If one blik is better than another, but is not amenable to
empirical verification and falsification, then the bliks are liable to endless
qualifications with no convincing proof»39.
Another analysis of religious belief which can be classified as an
emotive or expressive theory is the one proposed by Steward R. Suther-
land40. This author proposes a revision of Christian religious beliefs claim-
ing that the language Christians use in talking about God is untenable. He
finds the assertion «God is good» incompatible with evil and suffering,
and the belief that «God is eternal» as likewise incompatible with the
claim that God acts in the world. He therefore proposes an agnostic posi-
tion and the restriction of the theistic way of thinking. For being part of the
European culture, he does not suggest an abandonment of Christianity, but
only its revision. Sutherland reduces the Christian religion to some of its
expressive aspects.
Sutherland claims that what is essential in Christianity is not the
idea of a personal God but the possibility of contemplating human realities
sub specie aeternitatis. This expression according to Sutherland contains
two elements: the first is hope –and also the belief– that it is possible to un-
derstand human realities not in a way relative to an individual, community
or epoch; and second is the implication that such a vision is not relative to
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humanity’s way of looking at things. This presupposes the acknowledge-
ment of the possibility of some transcendent and eternal values which he
does not claim exist but are only possible. The idea of looking at things sub
specie aeternitatis is not descriptive but only regulative.
2. CONATIVE THEORY
Along the lines of the emotive/expressive theory of religious belief
is the position of those authors who emphasize the conative aspect of faith
to the detriment of its cognitive value. According to the authors who sup-
port this theory, the propositions of the faith do not have any cognitive val-
ue; their importance lies in the fact that they commit the believer to live a
certain and concrete way of life41. R. B. Braithwaite and R. W. Hepburn,
maintain this line of thinking.
Assuming the positivist vision, braithwrite explains that religious
propositions, like moral propositions, even if not totally deprived of meaning,
are nothing but expressions of believers attitudes. Religious affirmations are
moral affirmations42. Faith gives to the believer a group of propositions
(Christian stories) in order to familiarize him with some moral principles
through his fantasy, imagination and hope. To believe in a proposition is to be
disposed to «act as if» the proposition were true43. Religious beliefs are «an
intention to behave in a correct way (a moral belief) together with the consid-
eration of certain associated stories with the intention in the mind of the be-
liever»44. In the case of Christianity, Braithewaite explains that these stories
are meant to invite the believer to live an agapeistic life, a life characterized
by love. Thus he says: «Unless a Christian’s assertion that God is love
(agape) –which I take to epitomize the assertions of the Christian religion– be
taken to declare his intention to follow an agapeistic way of life, he could be
asked what is the connection between the assertion and the intention, between
Christian belief and Christian practice»45.
Christianity is distinguished from other moral systems basically by
the stories associated with its moral principles. These stories are «proposi-
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tions which are straightforwardly empirical propositions capable of empir-
ical test and which are thought of by the religious man in connection with
his resolution to follow the way of life advocated by his religion»46. It is
not necessary for the believer to believe in the truth of the stories but only
that they have meaning for him. Their function is merely psychological. In
the case of Christianity, one cannot be «a professing Christian unless he
both proposes to live according to Christian moral principles and associ-
ates his intention with thinking of Christian stories; but he need not believe
that the empirical propositions presented by the stories correspond to em-
pirical fact»47.
Conesa says that Braithwaite reduces the Christian faith to «acting-
as-if» its stories were true48. Macquarrie comments that «by assimilating
religious assertions with moral assertions, he (Braithwaite) has undoubted-
ly exaggerated his thesis beyond the plausible. The religious man certainly
is committed to a certain style of life but believes at the same time that his
religion helps him understand what is the type of world he has to follow
this style of life»49. Furthermore, by functionally analyzing the language of
religion, Braithwaite transforms religious statements into the language of
morality embellished by stories which Peterson et. al. compare to the posi-
tivistic mistake of trying to reduce religious statements to empirical facts50.
Donald Hudson calls this kind of mistake a violation of the «depth gram-
mar» of religion, claiming that religious discourse has its own unique char-
acter and function51.
Similar to the conative theory of Braithwaite is the one maintained
by Ronald W. Hepburn, who accepts the empirical and naturalistic ideas of
Braithwaite52. Hepburn claims that one can maintain a religious orientation
in life even in the absence of reference to a belief in God or a metaphysical
system. This author claims that attitudes and beliefs can be considered reli-
gious so long as they comply with three conditions. In the first place, the
believer must adjust to a certain ethical behavior. This kind of life is ac-
cepted simply as a fundamental moral option. While empirical facts are
relevant to one’s options, the believer may not derive his option from any
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fact. Secondly, what distinguishes religious discourse from moral language
is the fact that religious discourse provides a strictly coherent parable or
myth capable of expressing correctly the chosen kind of life and which in-
vites the believer to practice it. And thirdly, the parable and the model of
life associated with it constitute the rule for all the different aspects of the
life of the believer. They demand his supreme fidelity and determine the
total imaginative vision of life and of man53.
There is hardly any difference between the coherent and total histo-
ries of Hepburn and the stories of Braithwaite. Their differences however
rests on the fact that while Braithwaite thinks that his thesis is compatible
with historical Christianity, Hepburn acknowledges that his explanation is
incompatible with it. Commenting on the thesis of Braithwaite and Hep-
burn, Blackstone says that «the point is that the Braithwaite-Hepburn the-
sis is not to be taken as a descriptively accurate account of what believers
think is going on in religious discourse, but rather a prescriptive thesis, a
thesis that theirs is the most intelligible account of theological language
compatible with empiricism. In effect they are saying: If you want to be a
consistent empiricist, then you should adopt a conative theory of theologi-
cal language»54.
The logical positivism or neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle de-
nied cognitive meaningfulness to religious and theological assertions. For
being non-verifiable, they claimed that these assertions are nothing but
cognitive nonsense. The falsifiability principle of Flew claimed that the
concepts of truth and falsity could not be accorded to the religious and the-
ological assertions of believers since no state of affairs could count against
these assertions. If a statement is therefore compatible with any state of af-
fairs, then the statement says nothing and is not a factually significant as-
sertion. The emotive/ expressive and conative theories likewise denied any
cognitive value to religious and theological assertions; the former relegat-
ed them to the sphere of the emotions and feelings, while the latter claimed
that these propositions only make the believer commit himself to live a
concrete way of life. All of these theories can be classified into the non-
cognitive analysis of faith.
In spite of the reductionistic character of the theories which came
about as a response to the falsifiability challenge of Flew, these non-cogni-
tive assessments highlight important, though partial aspects of faith. The
emotive theory for which faith is a vital attitude from which man contem-
plates the world is partially true and cannot be undervalued. The conative
analysis which claims that faith is the believer’s commitment to a way of
life is likewise to a certain extent true and is undeniable. However, even if
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partially true, these analyses are insufficient as an explanation of the phe-
nomenon of faith. One cannot understand how faith can have these dimen-
sions if not because the believer makes some affirmations rooted in reality
(therefore cognitive) and is not simply expressing feelings and vital atti-
tudes55.
Assessing the debates regarding the cognitivity of faith, Ross says that
«theologians were in large number frightened by the apparent dan-
ger to religion from the positivist’s conclusion that metaphysical and reli-
gious statements are empirically meaningless because they cannot be em-
pirically verified, and began a large scale retreat into other accounts of
religious meaning (emotive and other non-cognitive accounts) before it
was widely recognized by philosophers that there is no generally accept-
able criterion of empirical meaning, much less of cognitive meaning in its
widest sense. […] in the light of what we know now, the debate was archa-
ic as a fencing duel during an atomic war. […] Non-cognitivist accounts of
religious meaning are like a coroner’s report upon a man who hasn’t had an
accident yet»56.
III. COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF FAITH
Those theories which claim that faith is in a certain way knowledge
fall under the category of the cognitive analysis of faith. These theories
maintain that the concepts of truth and falsity can be applied to the reli-
gious and theological claims of believers. To be discussed hereunder are
the theories of Basil Mitchell and John Hick.
1. MITCHELL’S RESPONSE TO THE FALSIFIABILITY CHALLENGE
Basil Mitchell responded to the falsifiability challenge by claiming
that religious assertions are meaningful and cognitive, according to Flew’s
requirements. He presents his response in a form of a parable where a
Stranger assures a partisan that he is on their side of the resistance move-
ment57. The Stranger asks the partisan to just have faith in him. He indeed
helps their movement but at other times he is seen in the uniform of the po-
lice taking patriots into the custody of the occupying power. The friends of
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the patriots would complain on these occasions, but the partisan is still
strongly convinced that the Stranger is on their side. In spite of evidence to
the contrary, the partisan retains his faith in the Stranger that «he is on their
side».
«The partisan of the parable does not allow anything to count deci-
sively against the proposition “The Stranger is on our side”. This is because
he has committed himself to trust the Stranger. But he of course recognizes
that the Stranger’s ambiguous behavior does count against what he be-
lieves about him. It is precisely this situation which constitutes the trial of
his faith»58.
Mitchell says that unexplained evil and suffering do count against
some of the theological assertions of believers, in the same way the am-
biguous behavior of the Stranger in the parable of taking people into prison
did count against the assertion that «He is on our side». But believers do
not allow evil and suffering to count decisively against the theological as-
sertion that God is good and cares for his people, for example, just as the
partisan did not allow the doubtful behavior of the Stranger to count deci-
sively against the claim that the Stranger was on their side. The point here
is not that certain things do not count against the assertions of believers
–they do. But believers will not allow them to count decisively against
their faith.
Like other factually significant non-theological claims, the theolog-
ical claims of believers are not conclusively falsifiable. No one can deter-
mine a point where the believer will do away with his claims in the face of
contrary evidence. Religious assertions are part of the faith of believers
who believe that God has reasons for his actions even if sometimes they
are incomprehensible. Religious assertions are therefore cognitively and
factually significant –some things do count against them, even if the faith
of believers precludes them from making these things count decisively
against the faith. One may therefore say that religious beliefs are falsifiable
in principle though they may not be in practice59.
2. HICK’S ESCHATOLOGICAL VERIFICATION THEORY
Another response to the logical positivists’ non-cognitive challenge
to the religious assertions of believers was given by John Hick, who be-
lieves that the logic of theism is quite unique and complex. Hick attempted
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to meet Flew on his own grounds and went further than Mitchell by claim-
ing that theological assertions are cognitively significant since they are ver-
ifiable and falsifiable eschatologically, i.e., not in this life but in the life to
come. There is then a way to verify the claims of believers. He also tells of
a parable of two travelers walking together –one believes that the road leads
to the Celestial City while the other is convinced that it leads nowhere60.
«During the course of their journey, the issue between them is not
an experimental one […] And yet when they do turn the last corner it will
be apparent that one of them has been right all the time and the other
wrong. Thus although the issue between them has not been experimental, it
has nevertheless from the start been a real issue»61.
According to Hick, the theological assertions of believers are factu-
ally and cognitively significant for they are verifiable and falsifiable. It is
not however possible to verify and falsify them in temporal life but only in
the afterlife. Since a survival prediction is part of the corpus of Christian
belief, the experiences after death of the fulfillment of God’s purposes for
ourselves and communion with Him, would certainly constitute a verifica-
tion of the truth-claims of Christianity. Meanwhile, since man is still in via
and not in patria, such possible scenarios in the afterlife assure the cogni-
tive meaningfulness of theistic claims. If on the other hand there is no af-
terlife, then logically there would be no verification.
The problem with this answer of Hick however is with his notion of
empirical verification as applied eschatologically. «The problem is that
such a state is so far beyond our comprehension and knowledge that the
extension of the word “empirical”, whose meaning in this life is under-
stood, to the afterlife, which is so little understood, is questionable»62.
Those who deny the reality of the afterlife would certainly reject this no-
tion of eschatological verification.
Besides, is this the way the logical positivists understood the idea of
empirical verification? If verification is eschatological it is not verification
in the sense of the neo-positivists (for whom the evident is that which can
be experimented in specifiable and publicly available spacio-temporal con-
ditions) and, if it is verification, it is not eschatological in the meaning un-
derstood by religious faith and the Christian tradition63. The notion of em-
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pirical verification as understood by the logical positivists cannot be ex-
tended to the eschatological sphere without losing its contextual, historical
meaning. Be that as it may, Stiver says that Hick «scores a kind of techni-
cal or “Pyrrhic” victory over Flew. This victory has the liability, however,
of not being deemed satisfactory by Flew or by other believers. In other
words, it cannot be put to work»64.
Ross summarizes the challenges to the cognitive character of faith
as consisting of three distinct cognitivity attacks: the inaccessibility chal-
lenge, the skeptical challenge and the linguistic discontinuity hypothesis65.
He answers the inaccessibility challenge by claiming that religious dis-
course is a craft-bound discourse; he responds to the skeptical challenge by
asserting that testimony is a source of knowledge; and he answers the lin-
guistic discontinuity hypothesis by means of the theory of analogy. Ross’
answers to the first two challenges will be discussed hereafter, while his
response to the third challenge will be treated in the next chapter.
IV. THE INACCESSIBILITY CHALLENGE AND CRAFT-BOUND
DISCOURSE
1. THE INACCESSIBILITY CHALLENGE
As stated above (3.1.1), the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle
denied cognitive meaningfulness to religious discourse. They claimed that
religious and theological propositions are empty of cognitive meaning
since these propositions are not empirically verifiable. They lack even the
minimal merit of being cognitively meaningful –they are therefore nonsen-
sical. The inaccessibility challenge claims that one cannot know or discov-
er what these religious and theological propositions are all about. One has
no cognitive access to their content, no way to find out what they mean.
Religious discourse is like a foreign or undecipherable language66, so that
one cannot figure out what is said or what is claimed, just as the average
reader would have no way of finding out what this phrase means: «Both
switches were broken about sixteen feet from the point; so were all the
chairs. They were the only broken rails in the lead, though the fishbolts
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were snapped throughout and all the joints turn asunder». (a passage from
the novel, Death of a Train)67. The idea behind this non-cognitive attack is
that «religious discourse is to the intelligent non-believer the way jazz dis-
course is to the intelligent outsider: not that what is said is without a con-
tent appropriate for belief, etc., but that there is no way into the discourse
by which the observer can satisfactorily discover what is to be believed,
doubted, denied, etc.»68.
The importance of the question of the meaningfulness or religious
discourse rests on the fact that unless it is resolved that the language of be-
lievers is meaningful, the inquiry into whether religious knowledge exists
would be an exercise in futility since «the inquiry into religious knowledge
is itself a subsidiary of a larger inquiry into the meaningfulness of religious
discourse»69. Ross says that it might be granted that «a late twentieth-cen-
tury audience may not have antecedent interest in disputes about whether
sentences like “God loves all men” and “God will forgive the repentant
man”, are or are not without cognitive meaning. But from a theoretical
point of view this question […] is of cardinal importance. For if the ex-
pressions in religious discourse are without cognitive meaning, then there
is nothing (religiously relevant) to believe or to disbelieve, there is nothing
to be known»70. In other words, the inquiry into the meaningfulness of reli-
gious and theological propositions is logically prior to the question of
whether faith is cognitive or constitutes knowledge. The question about the
meaningfulness of these propositions must be tackled first, before the
question of whether knowledge, which could be qualified religious, is han-
dled.
2. RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
Since the question being addressed in this section is the cognitive
meaningfulness of religious discourse, it is but proper to deal first with the
question of what is meant by religious discourse. More often than not,
types of discourse are classified according to their contents71. Thus, there is
political discourse, philosophical discourse, scientific discourse and reli-
gious discourse, etc. This type of classification however is in a way mis-
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leading because it tends to separate the different types of discourse, as if
they were autonomous realities, unrelated among themselves. If this were
the case, communication between a politician and a philosopher, a scientist
and a religious believer, would be rendered impossible. But obviously,
even if the language a politician uses is peculiar, for example, whoever lis-
tens to him understands what he says. It is therefore preferable to talk not
of political discourse or philosophical discourse, but of the «political use»
or the «philosophical use» of language or discourse. The same can be said
of religious language. The language of believers is not some esoteric or
impenetrable reality, but the same language which other people use when
speaking or talking. It is therefore preferable to talk about the «religious
use of language» than «religious language» or «religious language
games». The religious use of language is the partial use of everyday lan-
guage, though it may be amplified and may have reference to another con-
text of life. Religious language is therefore the use which the religious be-
liever makes of everyday language.
Ross says that «there really is no language that, as such, is reli-
gious»72. The so-called religious language is nothing but ordinary language
used in a religious context. He describes religious language as «that por-
tion of natural language people use in religious talk, whether stating their
beliefs or unbelief, explaining a belief, telling religious stories, interpreting
their life events religiously (“God answered my prayer”), disputing about a
meaning of a sacred text, writing hymns or even popular religious songs
(Gospel music), praying, performing liturgy or religious rituals, asking di-
vine forgiveness for sins or transgressions and so on»73. He emphasizes
that religious language is not just «God talk» or «talking about God», pro
or con, even if this turns out to be a central element of the discourse and is
one of its central problems74. That talking about God is a central element in
religious discourse is seen by the fact that one can, as a first approxima-
tion, define religious discourse as «that whose content the word God is
used or that which is related, directly or indirectly, to this word»75.
That religious language is not some esoteric or other-worldly reali-
ty is also made clear by the fact that any language can be utilized to talk
about God and divine realities. «Religious talk can go on in any natural
language. The basic syntax (grammar) and semantics (meaning relation-
ships) of French, German, Attic Greek, Latin or Arabic are unchanged
when the languages are used in religious discourse»76. As R. Bell points
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out, «when the term “religious” is used with “language” it should draw our
attention to the fact that certain concepts are being used for religious pur-
poses, and not that some kind of semantic or substantive shift has been
made to a new type of discourse»77. Be that as it may, Ross explains that
religious talk has a specialized vocabulary of its own with «expressions
like “almighty”, “creator”, “sin”, “salvation”, “grace”, “predestination”,
and the like being characteristic of Jewish ritual discourse, and still others
characteristic of Islam, and so on. Within Christian sects, as in Jewish and
Islamic sects, there are further vocabulary peculiarities. Among some
Christian groups, for instance, the notion that Jesus is “my personal sav-
ior” is a central idea, not emphasized as much by other groups»78.
Ross further qualifies religious discourse by claiming that it «does
not have to be monotheistic (expressing belief in one supreme being) as it
is for Jews, Christians and Muslims. It can be polytheistic (many divine
beings), as was the discourse about the gods in ancient Greece and later
Rome and in German mythology. It can be polytheistic and pantheistic
(everything is in some sense divine), as in many African animist religions
and many oriental religions such as forms of Hinduism. It can even be
atheistic (religious without acknowledging any supreme or otherwise di-
vine being, as in some forms of Buddhism and Unitarianism)»79. Finding
the term «religious language» infelicitous, he prefers to use the term «reli-
gious talk» instead of the term «religious language», whether written or
spoken, regarding matters religious. This is so because Ross thinks that the
nearest analogues of «religious language» would have to be «bad lan-
guage», «obscure language», «smutty language», «obscene language», and
the like.
The religious man uses language for two principal objectives: talk-
ing with God and talking about God. Within religious talk, one can there-
fore distinguish between the language of prayer and invocation on the one
hand, and the language of testimony on the other hand. The former is
found in the liturgy, religious songs and in prayers; the latter would usual-
ly take the form of confession on the part of believers, revealing in the
process the existential commitment of the speaker. Since the language of
testimony depends on the formula «I believe», this language is likewise
termed as the language of faith80.
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3. CRAFT-BOUND DISCOURSE
Ross answers the inaccessibility challenge by claiming that reli-
gious discourse is a craft-bound discourse. What is a craft-bound dis-
course? A craft-bound discourse is that kind of discourse internal to a par-
ticular craft. Examples of crafts are medicine, law, music, philosophy,
farming, carpentry, sports, etc. Normally, the full grasp of a craft-bound
discourse is limited to the members or practitioners of a craft.
Ross says that a craft-bound discourse has five distinguishing char-
acteristic features81. First, part of the vocabulary of a craft-bound discourse
has affinities and oppositions of meaning which are obviously different
when the same words are found in an unbound discourse82.
Second, even if one might already know how to speak the language
of a craft-bound discourse, one has to learn how to use the craft discourse.
Learning the discourse requires not only learning the vocabulary, but
learning how to make justified construals, such as «We are on course»,
«The floor is level», «There is no platter for that turn-table».
Third, a craft discourse usually has a vocabulary of its own which is
internally interdefined and which is merely equivocal or metaphorical in
relation to the same words outside the craft in question. Strike in baseball
for example does not carry the same meaning as strike in the sentence «He
will strike you with a bat». Some words in a craft-bound discourse cannot
be found outside the craft at all, like «negligence per se» or «collateral
estoppel» in law.
Fourth, the discourse generally functions to motivate and modulate
human behavior in view of the attainment of the objectives of the craft.
Philosophers talk philosophy in order to do philosophy, as doctors talk
medicine in order to facilitate medical practice. This does not mean how-
ever that each particular utterance is behavior-modulating, but simply that
the function of the discourse is to modulate what the participants in the
craft think, say, do, see, perceive or conclude in the course of doing the
craft.
Finally, in a craft-bound discourse, there are conditions for the ac-
ceptability of expressions, paraphrase, qualifications and even presupposi-
tions which do not apply in an ordinary discourse and which cannot be
learned without participatory experience in a craft. One cannot for exam-
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ple send a complaint to the court and the defendant, but one files the com-
plaint with the court and serve the defendant.
A craft-bound discourse is therefore that discourse in which «skill
in action is necessary for a full grasp of the discourse»83. Ordinarily, one
masters a craft-bound discourse only if one becomes an insider to the do-
ing that the discourse is about.
4. RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE: A CRAFT-BOUND DISCOURSE
Religious discourse is an instance of a craft-bound discourse. There
is a close and intimate connection between the discourse of religion, Chris-
tianity or Judaism for example, and the behavior and conduct of those to
whom the discourse is directed –the believers, who are the participants in
the craft. Parents, ministers, priests and teachers of religion tell stories,
teach catechism, explain the creed, liturgy and rituals (make use of reli-
gious discourse) in view of influencing the conduct and behavior of the
members of religious community. Anyone knowledgeable about Christian-
ity or Judaism will instantly recognize that «bible stories, creedal teaching,
stories of saints, and all religious talk (even sermons when properly done)
are designed to modulate one’s conception of oneself and of one’s rela-
tionship to other people, to modulate one’s judgments about the physical
world, about the goals and values of life and one’s judgments about God
(who is to be encountered through faith, in obedience to moral law and in
the pursuit of holiness.)»84. Religious discourse is inherently action-orient-
ed, response-oriented and self-construal and judgment-oriented.
Ross says that religion is taught in order to modulate the life of faith
of the adherents of a particular religion. There is therefore an intimate and
tight connection between words and actions within the craft, in such a way
that liturgy, which is the enactment of the religious mysteries with words,
stories, song, poetry, physical movement and physical symbols, becomes
an indispensable religious reality in the practice and growth in the faith.
Communication and teaching that are carried out are directed to Christian
living, to the personal development and the integration of the believer’s
life, basic drives and desires. Truly living the life of faith and the ongoing
conversion of the believers is the aim of Christian discourse –it functions
to prompt, facilitate and modulate these objectives. Through the discourse,
the believers who are participants in the craft are enabled to make well-in-
formed judgments and apply religious predicates to themselves. One can
therefore say «I have been redeemed»; «I have sinned»; «I have been for-
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given»; «Christ died for me and rose again»; «I too will rise from the
dead». Without experience one cannot apply these predicates to oneself since
they are all products of self-construals. «Any account of religious dis-
course, denying that judgments based upon experience have any evidential
role in justifying statements about religious realities and about God, is
manifestly in error»85.
Ross claims that
«there can be no question that religious discourse satisfies the con-
ditions for craft-bound discourse, just as well, say, as does legal discourse
or the discourse of physicians, musical performers and abstract scientists.
Salvation is as much a craft objective as is health or the peaceful resolution
of controversy. You practice religion as you do law, medicine, or philoso-
phy, through judgments, justified through one’s construal of reality, and
directed toward action»86.
By its nature as a craft-bound discourse, religious discourse is inac-
cessible to «outsiders» who are not participants of the craft. Outsiders are
deprived of the privilege of making judgmental self-construals for the sim-
ple reason that they have no experience in living and practicing the craft
where the discourse is shared. The anti-cognitivist challenge which claims
that religious discourse is inaccessible, like an undecipherable language, is
therefore to miss the point87, because religious discourse is accessible on
the condition that one participates in the craft where the discourse is uti-
lized.
«Religious discourse is a craft-bound discourse not fully accessible
to those who have not taken up or at least seriously participated in the form
of life for which the discourse serves as a communicating thought form.
You can’t really grasp the talk of lawyers or doctors or mechanics unless
you can make the judgments they are competent to make, dispute in their
terms and generally, behave indistinguishably in the craft roles»88.
Music for example which has its own craft-bound discourse has its
own internal rationality whose discourse cannot be fully understood unless
one becomes a participant in the craft. As Ross says «there is no stable
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cognitive access to musical meaning, or how to perform a work or how to
interpret it, or even to what the musical elements are, such as what a C clef
is, or what a “key” is, what a diatonic scale is or chromaticism, or what
counts as “together” on an attack […] apart from musical practice»89.
Whatever is true in any craft-bound discourse is also true in religious dis-
course, in as far as accessibility is concerned. Ross avers that
«Full access can be gained only by one’s learning to talk as a mem-
ber of the community –to explain, defend, criticize, qualify, amplify and
otherwise assert claims in a mode of speaking that would appear “native”
to the dwellers of the belief system or the craft. […] Once we see that the
access to religious discourse is an instance of access to craft-bound dis-
course, in general, no specially religious problem remains. […] there sim-
ply is not a serious doubt that one can come to know what religious expres-
sions mean provided one will seriously take part in the discourse of the
community that employs it. The fact that the expressions may turn out to be
disappointingly vague or ambiguously employed or even wholly equivocal
in various applications should create no greater difficulty of access than we
encounter frequently with discourse about subjects other than God, sub-
jects as diverse as the interest paid by banks and the interests served by the
government»90.
In same vein, alluding to philosophers, Ross says
«The fact that some philosophers cannot understand religious talk
seemed important at first. They thought there must be something wrong
with the talk. Now we see the talk is craftbound, that you cannot fully un-
derstand it unless you learn it, and its making sense to you is connected
with your having or imagining a use for it to modulate living. The philoso-
phers who cannot understand the discourse have forgotten or abandoned or
never knew its use for getting certain results: they have disengaged the dis-
course from the practice it functions to modulate. No wonder it is vacuous
for them. People who use religious discourse in their living, learning and
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self-construals are cognitivists even if they talk nonsense; non-cognitivists
are outsiders to the forms of life, the practices, modulated by religious talk-
ing»91.
The idea that religious discourse is a craft-bound discourse and to
understand it one has to participate in the craft where the discourse is uti-
lized, takes its inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein indirectly criticized his previous view of lan-
guage exposed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, via criticism of Au-
gustine’s view of language92. Wittgenstein summarizes Augustine’s view of
language in this way: «the individual words in language name objects –sen-
tences are combinations of such names–. In this picture of language we find
the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands»93.
Wittgenstein saw many problems with this view which emphasizes single
words and ostention (pointing out), separated from the wider context where
language actually operates. The «desire for generalities» (the prejudicial
habit of making precipitate general conclusions omitting important aspects
of the object of study), is one of the principal problems of philosophy94.
Wittgenstein claims that in order to discern the meaning of words, it is im-
portant to see how they are actually used, rather than coming up with gener-
al definitions. «A great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed
if the mere act of naming is to make sense»95. His advice is: «Don’t think
but look»96. Emphasizing the importance of particular cases and the radical
contingency of facts, Wittgenstein rejects all essentialism: «The essence is
hidden from us»97. He says: «When philosophers use a word –“knowledge”,
“being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name”–, and try to grasp the essence
of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in
this way in the language-game where is its original home? What we do is to
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use»98. General-
ization is the wrenching of words out of their living use and one must avoid
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Blackwell, Oxford 1963, p. viii).
93. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations, # 2. (References are to para-
graph numbers and not to page numbers).
94. Cfr. CONESA, F. and NUBIOLA, J., Filosofía del lenguaje, p. 125.
95. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations, # 257.
96. Ibid., # 66.
97. Ibid., # 92.
98. Ibid., # 116.
this by returning words to the stream of life. Philosophical problems arise
when «language goes on a holiday»99. He was convinced that the task of
philosophy must only be to describe and not to prescribe how language ac-
tually functions, so as to avoid «the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language»100. «Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual
use of language [. . .] It leaves everything as it is»101.
If one examines ordinary language very closely, one can see that
words do not have only one appropriate use, but a variety of uses. Wittgen-
stein says «think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw,
a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. - The functions of
words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. […] Of course, what
confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken
or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us
clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!»102. He then suggests
that instead of thinking only of a single linguistic model, one must take into
account that there are a variety of language games103, where words have
their proper sense and meaning104. Words have meaning only in the appro-
priate context of each game. There are as many language-games as there are
linguistic activities. «Review the multiplicity of language-games in the fol-
lowing examples […] Giving orders and obeying them; describing the ap-
pearance of an object, or giving its measurements; constructing an object
from a description; reporting an event; speculating about an event; forming
and teaching a hypothesis […] making a joke and telling it; solving a prob-
lem in practical arithmetic; translating from one language into another; ask-
ing, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying»105. One cannot therefore reject
vast areas of language as non-sensical as did the Vienna circle and Wittgen-
stein himself in the Tractatus. One must consider the actual use of language
and not a generalized ideal use of the same.
Language presupposes a non-linguistic context Wittgenstein calls
«forms of life». «The speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form
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NUBIOLA, J., Filosofía del lenguaje, p. 127).
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105. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations, # 23.
of life»106. In order therefore to understand the meaning of a word, one
should take into account not only the linguistic context where the word is
used, but also the wider pragmatic context of the real life. The meaning of
words is supported by an entire background of actions and practices. «This
suggests to some extent that one must participate in or at least have some
empathy for a particular form of life in order to understand the meaning of
the language particular to it»107. To understand the meaning of a word, one
must examine the language game to which it belongs and the form of life
where it is used, «since the meaning of a word is its use in the language»108.
«A word or a sentence has the meaning that it has because somebody has
given it, and not because they are endowed by some power independent of
us. It we want to know or understand its meaning, one has to verify in what
circumstances was it given; that is, one has to identify how is the word or
sentence actually used»109. As Wittgenstein says «every sign by itself
seems dead. What gives it life? –In use it is alive»110.
If to understand the meaning of words one should consider the lan-
guage games where they are used, and the broader context of the forms of
life where the words are operative, does it mean now that the different of
language games are autonomous and independent from each other that
each game has its own criteria of meaning and truth, with the consequence
that truth is relative to a particular language game? Is truth and justifica-
tion limited to the boundaries of each game? A school of thought which
came to be known as Wittgenstenian Fideism111 maintains precisely the
idea that religious language is a specific and autonomous kind of language
game with its own distinct criteria of meaning and truth. «It is characteris-
tics of these philosophers to insist on the distance which exists between re-
ligious discourse and whatever other type of discourse. Applying the no-
tions of “language games” and “form of life” –developed by the second
Wittgenstein– they consider that faith is a peculiar language game or form
of life with proper criteria of justification, and with its own concept of
knowledge and truth which are not intelligible outside the religious con-
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110. Ibid. # 432. Just what does Wittgenstein mean by «forms of life?». Some
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rooted». (CONESA, F. and NUBIOLA, J., Filosofía del lenguaje, p. 129). «Just as there
are innumerable language games, so there are also innumerable forms of life». (Ibid.)
111. Cfr. NIELSEN, K., «Wittgenstenian Fideism» in Philosophy, 42 (1967), pp.
191-209.
text»112. D. Z. Philips is a prominent advocate of this point of view113. But
such a view is hardly defensible for the religious discourse of believers is
intimately connected, and not isolated from the language they use in their
day to day life activities. What is anomalous with the idea of Wittgensten-
ian Fideism is the claim that the religious language game and the religious
form of life are insulated and separated from other linguistic practices and
life activities114. So much traffic exist among the different kinds of lan-
guage games that one cannot insulate one game from the other. Wittgen-
stein himself observes that the different language games are interconnected
and interrelated among themselves and do not exist as autonomous and in-
dependent enclaves. An overlapping family resemblance among the differ-
ent uses of language is too obvious to be overlooked and left unnoticed. «I
can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than
“family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of
a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. overlap
and criss-cross in the same way. And I shall say: “games” form a fami-
ly»115. Truth cannot therefore be relative to each language game since all
these different games belong as it were to one and the same family. A fam-
ily resemblance exists among the different games.
From the above explanation of religious discourse as an instance of
a craft-bound discourse, it can now be concluded that the inaccessibility
challenge to the cognitive meaningfulness of religious discourse does not
hold water, after all. For being a craft-bound discourse, religious discourse
is cognitively accessible provided one participates in the practice of the
craft that is religious living. One must participate in the language game
where religious discourse is used. Religious discourse is therefore not in-
accessible as the anti-cognitivists erroneously claimed.
V. THE SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE AND TESTIMONY
Another attack on the cognitive character of faith is what Ross calls
the skeptical challenge –the anti-cognitive attack which denies truth value
to the religious and theological claims of believers. As noted above (3.1.2),
Anthony Flew has asserted that religious and theological claims, for not
being falsifiable, do not assert anything factual at all; hence they cannot be
accorded any truth value. The skeptical challenge says that «even if you
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come to know what the believer claims and even if what he claims is ap-
propriate for belief, disbelief, doubt, etc., still, you can never know
whether or not what has been said is true or false, hence, there is still no re-
ligious knowledge. The content of the assertions may be accessible to be-
lief. But the truth values are not cognitively accessible»116. Ross sees the
underlying reason behind this anti-cognitive attack as the exaggerated con-
trast between faith and science. Science is said to yield knowledge while
faith is alleged to produce nothing but unfounded and unjustified belief.
Truth-value can then only be accorded to the claims of science and not to
the claims of religion117.
1. FAITH (ACCEPTING SOMETHING ON TESTIMONY) IS A SOURCE
OF KNOWLEDGE
Ross answers the skeptical challenge by claiming that faith, which
is the acceptance of something on testimony, is a source of knowledge.
The importance of this assertion is based on the fact that if it established
that faith is indeed a means of knowledge, then there is no reason for any-
one to say that religious and theological claims, which have been accepted
on the testimony of Apostles and prophets (or of Christ or God himself)
cannot be accorded truth value. In other words, if testimony is a means to
obtaining the truth, then there is no basis for the skeptical challenge to
claim that the testimonial knowledge of believers cannot likewise be
true118.
That one can come to know the truth by the evidence of testimony
is so pervasive in life that a host of examples is not difficult to imagine,
from the most elemental knowledge to the more sophisticated. A large per-
centage of what one can justifiably claim to know comes through one’s ha-
bitual trust in the reports of witnesses, research of experts and even of the
opinions of those who are in the position to know. How does one know
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that one is the child of the two persons one considers as one’s parents?
That one was born on a specific date stated in the birth certificate? How
does one know that a president named Lincoln was assassinated and that
World War II was fought in Europe but not in Iceland? And that the gov-
ernment prints money?119. One can certainly claim to know all these things
and many more (examples can be cited ad infinitum), simply by relying on
records, historical documents and the testimony of other people. One can
know all these things simply by accepting the testimony of reliable
sources. One can even know that AIDS is a dangerous disease or even a
virus, even without inquiring what a virus is or whether viruses are living
things. Ross says that «to think that we do not know that PCB’s are dan-
gerous in the water supply because we have not established it or even read
the proof is just being foolish not philosophical»120.
Coming to know things on the evidence of testimony is indeed the
normal and usual way of finding things out. Oftentimes it is logically nec-
essary for some kind of knowledge, as in the whereabouts of a person at a
particular moment. Sometimes it is psychologically necessary as in the in-
formation that a loved one was not one of the casualties in a vehicular acci-
dent in a far away place. At other times it is physically necessary and be-
yond the practically feasible, since to verify every bit of information or
data personally requires time and resources which may not be available,
and even if available would mean useless duplication121. If one for example
is a bird watcher and identifies a certain type based on a classification of
some published authority, one can come to know that the N-Wabler has
appeared north of Philadelphia. But if one insists on establishing for one-
self the classification of bird types, one would not have completed the
work before the evidence flew south for the winter122. Making independent
checks for every bit of information needed in one’s life and their cost in
time, effort and money would be positively unreasonable as a way of life,
because one can certainly know things even without personal independent
verification, by just relying on the authoritative testimony of others.
The claim that only science can proportion knowledge is defeated
by the mere fact that science is itself a system of trust and reliances. Even
such elemental matters as the identification of instruments depends upon
the consensus of belief. That the ruler one uses to measure is really twelve
inches, that the beaker holds one pint, that the catalogue is not a pack of
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lies, are but few examples of coming to know and acquiring knowledge
based on the acceptance of the testimony of other persons in the field of
science. Without testimony, science would have been an impossible enter-
prise. As Newton stood on the testimonial shoulders of giants, so every
scientist must stand on the testimonial shoulders of other scientists, past
and present123.
That knowledge acquired through testimony is so pervasive in life
is even made clear by the fact that
«the background condition of the possibility of the sort of sophisti-
cated knowledge one is expected to have in later life is the testimonial
knowledge conveyed by one’s teachers. What else do we send students to
college for but to be told what is so or to be told how to find out? Why
don’t we give students a spoon and a microscope, a pencil and a pad and
say “Go find out?”. Because you can’t find out without the background of
testified belief. For most people most of the time the background of belief
within which the person finds out for himself was acquired by his being
told»124.
Can the possibility of errors and mistakes support the skeptical po-
sition? That errors and mistakes are possible in the acquisition of knowl-
edge through testimony is undeniable; that this possibility discredits the
fact that testimony can be a source of knowledge is not convincing. This is
true not only with respect to testimony but also in perception (even memo-
ry and reasoning). When one acquires knowledge through perception, it is
always possible that one could be mistaken or could be in error. But this
possibility of mistakes and errors does not take away the fact that one can
have perceptual knowledge. That mistakes and errors are possible is true;
that they always happen is false. When one accepts something on testimo-
ny the possibility that the witness or testifier is mistaken or lying or mis-
stating his beliefs or that the person misunderstands him is present –but
that it actually does happen, or always happen, is rather untenable. It is not
true that mistakes and errors always occur125. In spite of the possibility of
mistakes and errors, faith then which is the acceptance of something on
testimony, is a source of knowledge.
In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga calls testimony a sec-
ond class citizen in the epistemic republic, compared to, for example, per-
ception, even memory and basic reasoning. His contention is that testimo-
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ny is parasitic on other sources of belief as far as warrant goes i.e., «if you
tell me something and I believe it on your say-so, I have warrant for it only
if you do»126. Moreover, there is a cognitively superior way than testimony
that can provide warrant to a belief. «... an eyewitness report carries more
weight than a report from someone to whom the eyewitness told what he
saw»127. Sennet calls these observations epistemic dependence and epis-
temic inferiority respectively128. However, there is no reason why testimo-
ny cannot be accorded a first class citizenship as well.
With regard to epistemic dependence, it is true that one’s warrant
for proposition p based on testimony is indeed dependent on the testifier’s
warrant for his belief of proposition p. If I tell you that I visited Japan in
1998 and you believe me, the warrant of your testimonial belief that «I vis-
ited Japan in 1998» is dependent on the warrant I possess of this particular
belief. But this feature is not unique to testimony. The perceptual belief
that I am seeing a kangaroo now is dependent on my memory belief of pic-
tures of these animals I saw before or of the testimonial belief of teachers
who told me what a kangaroo looks like. So with reasoning. The warrant
that I have that this particular form of logical deduction is correct is depen-
dent on my memory belief or testimonial belief that certain inference pat-
terns are valid. In fact, in many cases, the warrant for perceptual, memory
and reasoning beliefs are dependent on testimonial beliefs acquired from
others129. Dependency in as far as warrant is concerned is therefore not en-
demic to testimony alone.
With regards to the second observation that there are cognitively
better ways for one to have warrant for proposition p than the warrant one
gets based on testimony, again one can say that this feature is not only
found in testimony. My perceptual belief, for example, that the x-ray pho-
tographs in front of me shows that I have a hairline fracture in my tibia, has
less warrant than if the belief were produced by my doctors say-so. In this
case, there is a better way to get warrant than my own perception –an ex-
pert’s testimony. One’s memory beliefs have inferior warrant than the
original perceptual or testimonial beliefs of which they are just memories.
So with basic reasoning. One’s feeble attempts at research about the uni-
verse has less warrant than the testimony of physicists or geologists who
have been studying the structure of the cosmos for many years130. Planti-
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nga’s reservations then about the status of testimony relative to warrant are
not that convincing. There is no reason therefore why testimony cannot
also be first class citizen in the epistemic republic, the way perception,
memory and reasoning are.
Testimony then is a source of knowledge and is no less reliable than
perception, memory and basic reasoning. In Fides et Ratio, the Pope em-
phasizes the fact that testimony is truly a source of knowledge, saying:
«There are in the life of a human being many more truths which are
simply believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verifica-
tion. Who, for instance, could assess critically the countless scientific find-
ings upon which modern life is based? Who could personally examine the
flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the world
and which is generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew
the paths of experience and thought which have yielded the treasures of hu-
man wisdom and religion? This means that the human being –the one who
seeks the truth– is also the one who lives by belief»131.
After explicating that testimony is indeed a source of knowledge,
Ross says that one must focus on the originating experiences of Apostles
and prophets, who received God’s revelation and upon which the beliefs of
Christians are based. If the encounter of the Apostles and prophets with
God was just a hoax, even granting that testimony is a source of knowl-
edge, then the beliefs of Christianity cannot be any less, since these beliefs
are based on the originating experiences of these Apostles and prophets.
On the other hand, if the originating experiences were veridical and knowl-
edge making, then there is no reason why the beliefs of Christianity, which
traces its origin to these experiences and was handed down testimonially
from one generation to the next, cannot be considered knowledge and ac-
cordingly accorded truth-value, which is precisely what the skeptical chal-
lenge denies. In other words, if the original experiences of Apostles and
prophets was warranted, then there is no reason why Christianity as a testi-
monially based belief cannot be warranted also. Ross calls this a central
epistemological issue in the examination of whether Christian beliefs
could be accorded truth-value132.
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if God motivated this belief […]. They were in a position to know only if the experi-
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whether the kinds of experiences given the prophets and apostles could have been a
source for the knowledge claimed. It is their experiences on which the testimony of the
2. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
How does Ross explain the original experiences of the Apostles and
prophets? He claims that the Apostles and prophets underwent religious
experiences through which they received God’s revelation and which now
constitutes the Christian faith. «These prophets, Apostles and disciples
through encounter with God discerned what God wished to have commu-
nicated to other men. The function of the religious experience was to pro-
duce a state of revelation which could be transmitted through the preach-
ing of the “Kingdom of God at hand”. The function of the religious
experience was to achieve the authoritative declaration of the divine mes-
sage»133. He explains the nature of this encounter with God in experience
as including all types of perception, linguistic and sensory perception in-
cluded. Linguistic factors, community beliefs and personal expectations all
contribute important roles in the generation of the appropriate experiences,
through which the Apostles and prophets received the truths of the revela-
tory event.
2.1. Perceptual Sets
Ross says that a sensory information becomes meaningful and pro-
vides warrant for a particular perception only if the sensory event is as-
signed significance. The habit which is developed in assigning signifi-
cance to sensory information is called a perceptual set134. «For a perceptual
experience to be “full” the person must assign significance to the experi-
ence as a whole»135.
Take an example of a native who finds a watch while walking along
the beach one day. After examining the object, he does not know what it is,
thinks of it as useless and throws it away. Years later, he is asked if he has
ever seen a watch. He answers no and he is both right and wrong. He is
wrong because there was something he saw which was a watch and right
because there was nothing that he saw to be a watch. Take another exam-
ple of a woman stalled in the countryside. When asked why she didn’t stop
the car when she heard the radiator boiling over, she replies that all she
heard was a loud noise and a few whistles, and nothing about the radiator.
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She was not able to figure out the car problem for her failure to assign sig-
nificance to the sound of the radiator.
Both the native and the woman in the above examples failed to as-
sign proper significance to their perceptual experiences. It was not because
of a failure of their intellects. They were simply not rich enough in experi-
ences to give significance to the sensory stimuli they were faced with. «In
order to see that x is F, you must be inclined to see (regard) x as F; seeing-
as is the pre-requisite for all the more sophisticated forms of seeing-
that»136. One must know what questions to ask and what kind of checks and
expectations are appropriate, given a particular sensory stimuli, for the ex-
perience to be worthwhile and meaningful137. Ross claims that
«it is the element of significance assignment (ignored in most dis-
cussions of empirical knowledge ...) which converts the apparently irrele-
vant into the warrant for belief; it transforms a qualitatively empty experi-
ence into an appreciation of purpose, beauty or potentiality. Assigning a
significance affects the way the sensory data is manipulated and results in
the construction of relations by which the data warrant belief»138.
The Apostles and prophets were rich enough in experiences that
they were able to perceive God’s revelatory event which was closed to oth-
ers in their communities. They found themselves in the presence of the
holy, of God and were enabled to listen to his words. They «found» God
because they were rich in experiences and expectations to notice that God
was at work in the events considered revelatory. It is true that many have
seen the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showing forth
the work of his hands; but it is equally true that only a few have seen that
the heavens indeed declare the glory of God and the heavens show forth
the work of his hands. Ross asks: «Is there any reason to deny that the very
same thing that I see (for example, a mountain traversed by a valley and
crowned with purple clouds) may, while it is still data-for-seeing and not
yet seen, be assigned significance so that one’s mind is directly conveyed
to the presence of God or of God’s will?»139. Without perceptual sets, one
cannot assign significance to events so that they become an experience of
the divine. It is a question of not being rich in experiences that many fail to
feel the presence of God and see his hand in revelatory events.
454 DENNIS RAMOS INOCANDO
136. Ibid., p. 98.
137. Ross says that «the ability to assign significance is often what differentiates
the expert from the neophyte. The “natural” genius is distinguished by his intuitive
and uneducated powers at it. The power to reorganize the data, to regard things as dif-
ferent from the way they are commonly regarded is characteristic of the creative
imagination and accounts for the discoveries of great originators». (Ibid., p. 100).
138. Ibid., p. 100.
139. Ibid., p. 101.
2.2. Disclosure Situations
The presence of perceptual sets paves the way for what Ross calls
disclosure situations, which in turn may give birth to the acquisition of
new perceptual sets.
One day a native discovers a metal object along a deserted beach.
Upon returning to his abode, he examines the object in detail and could
find no explanation as to what the object could be for. In one of his hunting
trips, he meets a missionary who shows him a bible. Realizing the similar-
ity of the marks in the object he found and those printed on the pages of the
bible, everything became clear in a flash: he found something used to
make bibles. Another example could be of a student having difficulty un-
derstanding the Pythagorean theorem. He is offered a standard proof but
could not understand. He is given a simplified illustration, still no compre-
hension. The teacher makes a sketch on a piece of paper and the student
suddenly exclaims «Now I see!» In a flash, he understood. In both exam-
ples, a disclosure situation took place. A disclosure situation then is an ex-
perience wherein one suddenly «gets the point» where before one was
faced with a blank and the meaningless. Before a disclosure situation takes
place, one may have to get puzzled first and feel the knitting of his brows.
Intelligibility is the result of disclosure.
The New Testament story of the Transfiguration is a good example
of a disclosure situation. The disciples’ belief in Jesus was altered upon
seeing the vision of the Lord clothed in a garment as white as snow with
Moses and Elijah by his side. It suddenly dawned on them that Jesus was
someone totally out of the class of other men, making them fall down in
fear and trembling. A new perceptual set was acquired after the event.
Ross says that disclosure situations are the means to understanding the
meaning in events; for the Apostles and prophets, they were revelatory
events. «Disclosure is a sudden and dramatic seeing x to be something,
something other than what you took x to be or would have taken x to be
without the perceptual set that controls the perceptual judgment»140. Whole
lives are changed as a result of disclosure. Sudden alterings of experience
are especially good at disclosure. «Experience of the horrible, the mysteri-
ous, the lovely, the lonely, the evil, the ecstatic, the joyful, the beautiful
–all may serve to disclose the relatedness of other experiences and bring
one suddenly or gradually, to a recognition of the presence of God and
even to explicit conviction about things to be believed or done»141. Mo-
ments of disclosure are propitious times in the progress of humanity. Hu-
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man knowledge takes an unprecedented leap is such situation. As Ian
Ramsey says «The penny drops», and new things are disclosed142.
How does the foregoing advance the inquiry into religious knowl-
edge? Ross says:
«It is likely that among ancient peoples the recitation of the tribal
myths concerning God filled with symbols and assigning meaning relation-
ships to various natural events (like storms, illness, good fortune, etc.) cre-
ated in some extraordinary men both the desire to encounter God and a
propensity to find in events indications of the presence of God, so that a
perceptual set (or family of them) was generated in some individuals which
both (1) realized community expectations as to the description of God and
(2) disposed the individuals to have the experiences in which the divine
was revealed to them in the transfiguration of the normal: thus, the appear-
ance of God in the burning bush»143.
As in all perceptual experiences, the religious experience of the
originators of religion did not take place in a vacuum. The experience of
the Apostles and prophets where they encountered God in revelatory
events was made possible through a confluence of factors. Ross under-
scores the contribution of linguistic factors, community beliefs and indi-
vidual expectations in the encounter with God. Linguistic factors, talking
in a certain way, have influence in one’s perception of events. The belief
experiences of the community to which one belongs becomes the point of
reference and a precondition for the perceptual experience. And one’s psy-
chological disposition paves the way for the generation of one’s readiness
to encounter what is desired and expected. When these factors interact,
events are as it were transfigured and God is encountered in experience144.
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For being rooted in experience, one therefore cannot deny that the original
encounter of the Apostles and prophets with God was epistemically sound
and knowledge-making.
While this explanation of the original experiences of the Apostles
and prophets in terms of perception may not be denied its own merit, such
an account however seems simplistic and incomplete. One’s encounter
with God cannot simply be a result of theoretical conclusions based on
logical reasoning. The originators of religion who received God’s revelato-
ry intervention must have undergone the experience of a rare and awesome
Presence, whose nature cannot be other than divine. As Edith Stein rightly
says:
«What gives a prophet the security that he is before God? Seeing
with the eyes or imaginative force are not sufficient for this. All this can
fail, but nevertheless one can be interiorly certain that it is God who
speaks. This security is supported by the feeling that God is present; it is
felt that one is touched by Him in the most profound (of his being). This is
what we call the experience of God in the proper sense. It is the nucleus of
all mystical experience: the person to person encounter with God»145.
Since testimony is a source of knowledge and since the originating
experiences of Apostles and prophets, rooted in experience, shows no epis-
temological infirmity, then there is no reason why the beliefs of Christians
at present, (testimonially handed down from the original experiences of
those who encountered God in experience), cannot be accorded truth val-
ue. «Religious belief does not display some epistemic inferiority as com-
pared with the rest of human knowledge […] we have no reason to doubt
that at least some of the believers have acquired knowledge by faith con-
cerning matters faithfully transmitted, from originating experiences which
did involve a direct encounter with God»146. As Ross explains,
«If the burning bush really is a theophany, if God really is present
and Moses encounters him, then the long chain of testimony is suitably
rooted in experience, and knowledge is available to those who listen, to
those who believe»147.
The tenets of the faith of believers come from the Apostles and
prophets who encountered God in religious experience and received the di-
vine message. The message was faithfully transmitted to subsequent gen-
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erations which now form the core religious beliefs of Christians. Since one
cannot see anything epistemically anomalous in the original experiences of
the Apostles and prophets and in the fact that testimony is a source of
knowledge, then there is no reason to be skeptical about the truth values of
religious claims. To do so would mean to be skeptical about the claims of
the sciences too, since science is a field where perceptual experiential
knowledge and testimonially based knowledge also pervade.
CONCLUSIONS
1. It has always been generally accepted that humans could speak
meaningfully of God. Even though Hume launched the first modern version
of non-cognitivism, the issue of the cognitivity of faith was not hotly debat-
ed until the middle part of the last century, when the logical positivists of
the Vienna Circle, launched what came to be known as the verifiability
principle. This group of scientists, philosophers and mathematicians ac-
cepted as cognitively meaningful only those propositions which are either
analytic or tautological and those that are empirically verifiable. According
to the verifiability principle, a proposition is cognitive and meaningful only
if it expresses an empirical state of affairs. Since metaphysical, ethical and
religious propositions are clearly not verifiable empirically, they therefore
concluded that these propositions are all cognitive non-sense. It was A. J.
Ayer who introduced and extended the principles of the Vienna Circle, with
its anti-metaphysical and anti-religious bias, to the English-speaking world.
The challenged posed by the logical positivists to religion was worse than
atheism: while atheism may claim that for want of evidence religious be-
liefs are false, the logical positivists asserted that religious claims have not
even reached the minimal merit of being meaningful. Closely related to the
verifiability principle was the falsifiability principle of Anthony Flew, who
questioned whether religious statements can be considered genuine asser-
tions at all. He claimed that believers do not allow their religious and theo-
logical claims to be falsified by continually modifying and qualifying them.
If no state of affairs could count against the original religious assertions,
then these assertions do not say anything at all, neither affirming nor deny-
ing that something is actually the case. Believers kill their own claims by a
«thousand qualifications».
Both these principles are unconvincing. The verifiability principle’s
claim that «only those statements which are empirically verifiable are
meaningful» is self-referentially inconsistent, for this principle is itself not
empirically verifiable. Furthermore, the principle goes against the actual
practice of science (which they claimed is the only area with meaningful
statements), for scientists consider their claims to be totally meaningful
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even if, at the time the claims are made, scientists are still without exact
verifications of their claims. Conclusive verification is not the gauge for
the meaningfulness of scientific claims. The falsifiability principle, on the
other hand, misses the whole point of the cognitivity issue by applying a
criterion (empirical proof) to Christian discourse which is foreign to its
history. Besides, the application of the principle to religious propositions
violates the intent of its originator (Popper) who explained that this criteri-
on applies only to science and not to metaphysical and theological claims.
2. Philosophers were not slow in reacting to the challenge to reli-
gion made by the logical positivists. The response to them is generally di-
vided into the right-wing and the left-wing responses. The former asserts
that the religious claims of believers are cognitive, while the latter claim
that they are not. Ross belongs to the right-wing response for he defends
the cognitive character of the assertions of believers.
The emotive or expressive theory and the conative theory of reli-
gious assertions belong to the left wing response. The emotive/expressive
theory claims that since the religious assertions of believers do not pertain
to facts nor are they about the data of the senses, their value is only emo-
tive or expressive, but not cognitive. Randall says that religious assertions
serve only as motives for people to act in a determined way. Hare claims
that religious assertions are only expressions of one’s attitude with respect
to the world he calls this blik; a blik can be sensible or insensible but can-
not be either true or false. Sutherland reduces the Christian religion to
some of its expressive aspects. The conative theory says that the proposi-
tions of believers commit them to live a certain and concrete way of life,
but they do not have any cognitive value. Braithwaite says that religious
beliefs are intentions of believers to behave in a certain way; for Chris-
tains, it is the agapeistic way of life. Hepburn on the other hand asserts that
religious discourse provides a coherent principle, in parables and myths, to
which believers are invited to practice. These theories are reductionistic in
character and insufficient, even if they certainly express some aspects of
the faith of believers.
The responses of Mitchell and Hick to the falsifiability challenge
of Flew belong to the right-wing response. Mitchell says against Flew that
there are things that do count against the religious assertions of believers,
like evil and suffering. But believers do not allow them to count decisive-
ly against their assertions and concludes that religious assertions are still
cognitive according to the demands of Flew. Hick says that the religious
assertions of believers are cognitive in the sense that they are verifiable
and falsifiable. But they can only be verified and falsified in the afterlife,
not in this life. This response is however hardly acceptable for this is not
the kind of verification and falsification that the logical positivists had in
mind.
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3. The inaccessibility challenge to religious discourse alleges that
one cannot discover what the propositions in religious discourse are all
about. One has no cognitive access to their content and one cannot find out
what they mean. Religious discourse is like a foreign undecipherable lan-
guage, mere gibberish and non-sense. The answer to this challenge is im-
portant because if indeed religious discourse is inaccessible, then it would
logically follow that knowledge which could be qualified religious is not
possible. Ross explains there is no discourse that as such is religious. Reli-
gious discourse is ordinary discourse used in a religious context. It is that
part of natural language people use when talking about God and their reli-
gious experiences. Any language can be used in religious discourse and no
changes in the syntax and semantics takes place in the language used in the
discourse. The language used remains the same, even if religious discourse
requires a special vocabulary of its own.
Religious discourse is a craft-bound discourse and skill in action is
necessary for a full grasp of the discourse. Like any craft-bound discourse
(such as the discourse of lawyers, doctors, musicians, farmers, sportsmen),
one must participate in the craft where the discourse is used in order to ful-
ly grasp it. That people have no cognitive access to religious discourse is
due to the fact that they are «outsiders» to the craft where the discourse is
utilized. They therefore cannot totally understand what it is all about and it
seems nonsensical to them. The language of the traders at the New York
Stock Exchange might seem undecipherable to an outsider, even if they are
using ordinary language in their activities. Religious discourse cannot
therefore be accused of being inaccessible or nonsense, as the logical posi-
tivists claim –people just fail to fully grasp it since they are not «insiders»
to the craft where it is utilized to modulate the behavior of the participants
of the craft. This answer of Ross to the inaccessibility challenge takes its
inspiration from the Philosophical Investigations of the 2nd Wittgenstein
who, rejecting his earlier view of language, asserted that to understand the
meaning of a word, one must consider the language game and the form of
life to which the word belongs. As a craft-bound discourse, religious dis-
course is a particular language game, operating in a form of life that is reli-
gious living. The researcher could not agree more with Ross on the point.
4. Even if one has cognitive access to religious discourse, still one
cannot accord truth-value to it. One can never know whether the discourse
is true or false and therefore there is still no religious knowledge. This is
the skeptical challenge to religious discourse, whose underlying idea is
scientism, the claim that only science can proportion knowledge, while
faith gives only unfounded and unjustified belief, based as it is only on tes-
timony. Ross answers this challenge by claiming that testimony is indeed a
source of knowledge and that coming to know things through the evidence
of testimony is often logically, psychologically and physically necessary.
460 DENNIS RAMOS INOCANDO
To check every piece of information before believing it is simply an im-
practical way of life, since one can surely know things by taking the word
of others. To claim that only science can produce knowledge is self-defeat-
ing for science itself is pervaded by testimonially based knowledge. The
possibility of errors is a poor argument against testimony because error is
also possible in perception, memory and basic reasoning. Ross says that if
the originating experiences of Apostles and prophets, upon which the faith
is based, were veridical and knowledge-making, then there is no reason
why the Christian faith should be deprived of truth-value, since it came
through these experiences, handed down testimonially through the genera-
tions.
Ross claims that the originators of religion encountered God in ex-
perience through which they received the messages which now constitute
the core of the faith. Their encounter with God was made possible because
they had the right perceptual sets to see the hand of God in the revelatory
event. They experienced disclosure situations where God and his message
were revealed to them. Unless one has the right perceptual sets and en-
counters disclosure situations, one cannot see and figure out the full mean-
ing of events. This is precisely what the Apostles and prophets experienced
in their encounter with God in revelatory events. To explain the original
revelatory event only as a perceptual experience could be much more com-
plete if one developed it in terms of being touched by God in the profundi-
ty of one’s being –the core of all mystical experience. Considering there-
fore that testimony is a source of knowledge and that there was nothing
epistemically weird in the experiences of the originators of religion, then
there is nothing that can prevent the faith of Christians today, handed down
testimonially from the original experiences, from being accorded truth-val-
ue. The skeptical challenge only demonstrates the ignorance, even naiveté,
of its proponents.
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